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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we develop a specific observable symptom of a banking system that 
underprices the default spread in non-recourse asset-backed lending.  Using three different 
data sets for 18 countries and property types, we find that, following a negative demand 
shock, the “underpricing” economies experience far deeper asset market crashes than 
economies in which the put option is correctly priced.  Furthermore, only one of the 
countries in our sample continues to exhibit the underpricing symptom following a market 
crash.  This indicates that market crashes have a cleansing effect and eliminate 
underpricing at least for a period of time.  This makes investing in such markets safer 
following a negative demand shock. 
Keywords:  real estate bubble, lender optimism, disaster myopia, Asian financial crisis 
 2
1. Introduction 
All non-recourse asset-backed mortgage loans contain a put option that allows the 
borrower, through default, to “sell” the asset to the lender for the outstanding mortgage 
balance.  The default spread compensates the lender for this put option.  If correctly priced, 
the imbedded put option has no impact on asset markets.  If, however, the put is 
underpriced, efficient asset markets incorporate this mistake into the transaction price of the 
asset.  This leads to inflated asset prices above their fundamental level.1 
Our contribution is twofold.  First, utilizing the theory of Pavlov and Wachter 
(2002, 2005), we develop a specific and observable symptom of underpricing in the 
economy (discussed in Section 2).  Second, using data from 18 countries and property 
types, we empirically find that, following a negative demand shock, markets which exhibit 
the symptom of underpricing tend to experience far deeper market crashes than markets 
that do not exhibit the symptom.   
Following a negative demand shock, the asset prices in an economy which 
experiences underpricing have to fall far enough not only to reflect the new supply and 
demand conditions but also to eliminate the prior price inflation.2  Therefore, economies 
that experience underpricing, while not necessarily subject to a higher risk of market 
crashes, are subject to deeper crashes when they occur.   
Furthermore, only one of the countries in our sample continues to exhibit the 
underpricing symptom after its respective market crash.  This suggests that underpricing is 
                                                 
1 See Allen and Gale (1998 and 1999) and Pavlov and Wachter (2002, 2005) for models that show how 
underpricing of the put option leads to inflated asset prices.   
2 See Pavlov and Wachter (2002, 2005) for models that show how underpricing of the put option can 
exacerbate asset market crashes.   
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typically eliminated following a negative demand shock.  Therefore, investing is safer 
following large negative demand shocks as the risk of inflated asset prices is greatly 
reduced.  Of course, given enough time and absent institutional changes, some of these 
economies may switch back to underpricing.  This, in turn, would exacerbate any 
subsequent market crashes. 
Our study is distinct from the literature which estimates the fundamental price of an 
asset directly and detects asset price inflation by comparing the estimated to the observed 
price.3  While this approach is very intuitive, it ultimately suffers from an inability to 
distinguish between asset price bubbles and inappropriate models of the fundamental price.  
Other studies have focused selectively on macroeconomic ratios such as income to 
mortgage payment or income to price ratios.4  Yet another branch of this literature 
investigates local demand and supply conditions and potential for further development and 
metropolitan area limitations.  Such models are always vulnerable to the criticism that they 
are lacking fundamental features of the market that are efficiently contributing to price 
rises.  
In addition to finding support for our theory, our findings give policy makers and 
market participants a measurable symptom of underpricing.  If such underpricing is 
suspected, policy makers and regulators can take steps to eliminate it or at least contain its 
market-wide impact.  More importantly, both lenders and market participants can take 
measures to prepare for or hedge the expected increased magnitude of any future price 
                                                 
3 See for instance Smith, Smith, and Thompson (2005) for a direct estimation of real estate values in Los 
Angeles.  Other studies of the fundamental real estate values include Case and Shiller (2003), Krainer and 
Wei (2004), Krugman (2005), Leamer (2002), McCarthy and Peach (2004), and Shiller (2005), among others. 
4 Examples include Edelstein (2005) and Edelstein, Dokko, Lacayo, and Lee (1999).   
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declines should a negative demand shock occur.  Indeed while underpriced lending may not 
initiate unsustainable “asset bubbles” thereby causing market crashes, the underpricing of 
risk makes these crashes worse.  Moreover, Herring and Wachter (1999) demonstrate that 
price rises, even if efficient, may set off underpricing episodes.  Moreover, inefficient over 
pricing of assets is unlikely to be sustainable without supportive lending policies.   
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 develops the symptom of underpricing and 
formulates the testable empirical implication discussed above.  Section 3 describes the data, 
presents our main results, and provides robustness analysis utilizing various controls and 
econometric tests.  Section 4 examines in detail some of the markets we include in our 
empirical tests and provides an in-depth review of the economic conditions in each market 
that led to its respective asset price increase and crash.  Section 5 concludes with policy 
implications and direction for future research. 
2.  The Symptom of Underpricing 
There are two reasons for the lending spread, i.e. the value of the imbedded put 
option, to fall.  First, the default spread can narrow because the asset price volatility falls, 
which, in turn, reduces the value of the put option.  This is a rational reason to reduce the 
lending spread and has no impact on asset prices.  Note that a change in the volatility of the 
asset has little or no impact on the asset price because investors are diversified. 
The second reason lending spreads narrow is that lenders underprice the default 
risk.  This increases the asset prices because rational investors take advantage of the 
underpriced non-recourse lending even if they are fully diversified.   
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The transaction price of an asset financed through a non-recourse loan is the 
composite of the fundamental value of the asset, V, the value of the mortgage loan, M, and 
the face value of the adjustable-rate mortgage loan: 
 ( ) ( , ( ))P V M s Bσ σ σ= − + , (1) 
where σ denotes the expected future volatility of the asset and s denotes the spread of 
lending over deposit rates.  This spread compensates the lender for the put option imbedded 
in the non-recourse mortgage.  If the mortgage is priced correctly, its market value equals 
its face value, and the transaction price equals the fundamental value of the asset.  If the 
lending spread, s, changes in response to σ,  
 
0
0
s
P V M M s V
s
σ
σ σ σ σ σ
∂ >∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − = ≈∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (2) 
Since the spread adjusts to compensate the lender for the changes in the value of the 
put option imbedded in the mortgage loan, 0M M s
sσ σ
∂ ∂ ∂+ =∂ ∂ ∂ .  If the change in volatility of 
the asset is fully diversifiable, then 0Vσ
∂ =∂ .  If the increase in volatility affects the 
covariance of the asset return with the market, then 0Vσ
∂ <∂ , but still relatively small.   
The response of the asset price to the spread is: 
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Therefore, the correlation between transaction prices and lending spread is zero if 
the increase in asset volatility is fully diversifiable, and close to zero if it affects the 
covariance between the asset and the overall market. 
If, on the other hand, the spread changes because of underpricing, not in response to 
changes in expected future asset volatility, the response of the price to the spread is very 
different: 
 0, 0, 0s V M
s sσ
∂ ∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ ∂ > , (4) 
therefore, 
 0P V M M
s s s s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − = − <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . (5) 
Thus, the correlation between asset prices and lending spread is negative and driven 
by the sensitivity of the value of the mortgage to the lending spread, which is substantial. 
The above differential impact of default spread on asset prices produces the 
following symptom of underpricing:  
Underpricing of the default risk in non-recourse lending produces a negative 
correlation between asset returns and changes in the default spread.  Correctly 
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pricing the default risk in non-recourse lending produces no correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the default spread. 
Following an asset market negative demand shock, “underpricing” economies 
experience deeper market crashes because the new asset price not only reflects the new 
supply and demand conditions, but also eliminates the price inflation due to underpricing.  
This leads to the following empirical implication: 
Countries that experience underpricing (i.e., have a negative correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the default spread), experience larger market crashes 
following negative demand shocks. 
Therefore, narrowing of the lending spread is not sufficient evidence of 
underpricing or asset price inflation.  Instead, we need to observe a negative correlation 
between the landing spread and asset prices to suspect underpricing.  Moreover to 
determine whether the phenomenon of underpricing is contributing to higher asset prices 
we need to observe a positive relationship, all else equal, between the correlation and asset 
price rises.  While theoretically appealing, this approach does limit the practical 
applicability of our symptom as a tool to detect and combat underpricing.  Estimating the 
correlation requires a number of observations and introduces a substantial time lag between 
the start of underpricing and its detection.  Nonetheless, a measurable symptom is useful for 
countries and markets that track and report lending activity and asset prices in a timely 
fashion.  Absent the symptom we propose here, even these markets may not be able to 
detect underpricing before a market crash occurs.  Thus we develop and implement a test 
for whether underpricing contributes to asset price inflation based on the statistically 
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significant joint presence of price rises and a negative correlation of the  narrowing of the 
lending spread with asset price rises across countries, using an international database of 
property returns.  Furthermore, we test the sequential presence of negative correlation and 
large price declines following a negative demand shock.  Finally, we test the absence of 
negative correlation in all markets following a negative demand shock. 
3. Empirical Support 
To test the above theoretical predictions we need, at the minimum, property return 
data and the spread of lending over deposit rates for a number of countries and property 
types.  Lending and deposit rates are readily available from the World Bank.  Reliable 
property data with deep history is rare, however.  In this paper we use three distinct real 
estate property data sets, two international and one from a particular U.S. market.  While 
each of the data sets has its own advantages and shortfalls, taken together our empirical 
findings paint a picture which is strongly consistent the theoretical predictions above.   
3.1 Global Property Research Indices 
The largest of our three data sets is the Global Property Research Indices (GPR) 
compiled by Eichholtz, et. al. (1998) and refined and extended by Dr. Christopher Shun, 
Menang Corporation, Malaysia.  This data includes property indices for 25 countries over 
20 and 12 years for developed and emerging countries, respectively.  The GPR 250 Global 
Property Stocks index only includes property companies with a minimum of USD $50mn 
of freely available market value and high liquidity in terms of average last-year stock 
trading volume.  As of December 2002, the securities included in the GPR 250 index had a 
combined available market value of USD$194 bn.  
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This data set has a number of advantages.  In particular, it has the deepest history 
and the largest cross-sectional span across the globe of any real estate property database.  
Since the returns are based on publicly traded and liquid securities, the data quality is high, 
available at a monthly frequency, and is consistent through time.  The only drawback of 
this data is that it provides the returns of publicly traded securities rather then the actual 
returns to direct real estate investment.  As noted by Eichholtz, et. al. (1998) and by Chun 
(2002), the real estate investment trust returns used to construct the GPR indices are subject 
to stock market flow of funds effects and do not always follow the returns to direct real 
estate investment.  Nonetheless, our theoretical model is valid for both public and private 
real estate investments, and the use of REIT return data provides for a legitimate test of the 
theoretical predictions.   
The most direct test of the theoretical model described above is a negative 
relationship between the correlation of the change in lending spread and asset returns 
before the crash and the total price decline during the crash for each market.  Figure 1 
depicts a scatter plot of all observations with enough history to compute the correlation 
before the respective market crash.  The horizontal axis depicts the correlation between 
asset returns, including dividends, and the change in lending over deposit rate spread before 
the respective market crash.  Since market crashes occurred during different periods in each 
country, this correlation is computed over different time intervals.  We use data going as far 
back in time as possible up to the peak of the respective real estate market.  The vertical 
axis contains the percent decline, from top to bottom, during the most recent market crash 
for each country.  In some cases this decline spanned only a few months, while for others it 
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took a year or two.  Therefore, the vertical axis depicts the total decline, not annualized or 
adjusted in any way for the time frame it took for prices to adjust. 
Our theory predicts that a large negative correlation between asset returns and 
changes in lending spreads is a symptom of underpricing.  Countries that experience 
underpricing before their negative demand shock tend to experience far greater price 
declines during their market crash.  Consistent with this, Argentina, Sweden, Italy, 
Phillipines, Germany, and Malaysia displayed a large negative correlation between asset 
returns and changes in the lending spread before their respective crashes.  These same 
countries experienced very large price declines following their negative demand shocks, of 
50 to 85%.  Economies like Singapore, New Zealand, Norway, Hong Kong, Belgium, and 
Japan exhibited no or positive correlation between asset returns and lending spreads.  These 
countries, therefore, did not exhibit the symptom of underpricing developed in Section 2.  
While they also experienced negative demand shocks, their price declines were relatively 
more modest, between 25 and 68%.  A single variable regression using these observations 
has an R2 of 42% and a slope coefficient p-value of .0217.  These findings are consistent 
with the theory that a negative correlation between asset returns and changes in lending 
spreads is a symptom of underpricing, and that underpricing exacerbates market downturns.   
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Figure 1: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline 
Negative Correlation = Underpricing
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R2 of the regression line is 42% and the regression coefficient has p-value 0.0217.  The 
correlation is computed between the total index return, including dividends, and the change 
in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the correlation using 
data before the crash, i.e., from the beginning of our data set to the peak of the property 
market.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the property market, from top 
to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for each country.  According to 
our theory, negative correlation is a symptom of underpricing, and is associated with larger 
losses during a market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of 
underpricing have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines 
are relatively modest. 
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As a robustness check, we repeat the above analysis except using all available data, 
before, during, and after the crash, for each country, to compute the correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the lending spread.  This approach allows us to include more 
observations in the analysis, but has the major drawback that lending spreads may have 
increased in response to the market crash.  Following a negative demand shock, the 
perceived or actual risk of the asset markets typically increases.  Thus, the lending spread 
increases, rationally or not, following a negative demand shock irrespective of the 
underpricing behavior of lenders before the crash.  However, since low asset prices 
(following the crash) are associated with high lending spreads (following the crash), the 
correlation between asset returns and changes in the lending spreads may appear negative 
even in the absence of underpricing.  In other words, our theoretical implication will hold 
even in the absence of underpricing and using all data is not a direct test of our hypothesis.  
Nonetheless, we include it in Figure 2 as a form of robustness check. 
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Figure 2: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using All 
Available Data) 
Negative Correlation = Underpricing
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The R2 of the depicted regression is 38% and the p-value of the regression coefficient is 
.03.  The correlation is computed between the total index return, including dividends, and 
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using all available data before, during, and after the crash.  The vertical axis 
depicts the total percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom.  This is over 
one or more years and is specific for each country.  According to our theory, negative 
correlation is a symptom of underpricing, and is associated with larger losses during a 
market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of underpricing have zero or 
positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are relatively modest. 
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Pavlov and Wachter (2002, 2005) suggest that underpricing is eliminated, at least 
for a period of time, following a negative demand shock.  Our data presents an opportunity 
to test this prediction as well. In particular, we compute our symptom of underpricing, i.e., 
the correlation between asset returns and changes in the lending spread, following the 
negative demand shock in each country.   While we only have six observations with enough 
data to compute a meaningful correlation, our finding is consistent with the Pavlov-
Wachter prediction.  Following the negative demand shock, there is no relationship 
between the correlation of asset returns and changes in the lending spread and the 
magnitude of the previous crash.  Furthermore, only one country, Italy, continues to exhibit 
a negative correlation between asset returns and changes in the lending spread.  This 
suggests that in most cases negative demand shocks have a cleansing effect and eliminate 
underpricing in the economy, at least for a period of time. 
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Figure 3: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using Data 
After the Crash) 
 
Negative Correlation= underpricing
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The R2 of this regression is nearly zero and the slope coefficient is not significant.  The 
correlation is computed between the total index return, including dividends, and the change 
in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the correlation using 
data after the crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the property 
market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for each country.  
According to our theory, negative correlation is a symptom of underpricing, and is 
associated with larger losses during a market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the 
symptom of underpricing have zero or positive correlation.  Only one country, Italy, 
continues to exhibit the symptom of underpricing following its market crash.  Furthermore, 
we find no relationship between the correlation between asset returns and changes in 
lending spreads and the size of the decline. 
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3.2 Appraisal-based indices 
The above analysis is based entirely on publicly traded Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) to construct the property price indices across countries.  While this 
approach has the advantages of timely, accurate, high-frequency, and market-based data, it 
is vulnerable to any deviations of publicly traded REIT returns from the returns to direct 
real estate investment.  To mitigate this potential deficiency, we repeat the above analysis 
using the Investment Property Databank (IPD).5  This data uses annually appraised values 
for various types of commercial real estate to construct country and property type indices.   
Since this data contains only enough history to compute the correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the lending spread for only three countries, we use all available 
data, before, during, and after the crash to compute these correlations.  As noted above, this 
analysis suffers from the caveat that lending spreads may have increased in response to the 
market crash and independent of our theory.  Nonetheless, the similarity between figures 1 
and 2 above suggests that high negative correlation, even if computed over the entire 
sample period, is consistent with underpricing.   
Figure 4 depicts the correlation between asset returns and changes in lending over 
deposit rate spreads versus the percent decline, top to bottom, during the respective market 
crash for each country.  The correlation is computed using all available data.  Consistent 
with our analysis above using publicly traded REIT returns, countries and markets, such as 
Thailand and France – office, exhibit the symptom of underpricing and also experienced 
very severe price declines.  On the other hand, countries and markets like Hong Kong, 
                                                 
5 7 Greenland Place, London, NW1 0AP, United Kingdom. 
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Singapore, and Canada – residential, did not exhibit the symptom of underpricing and 
experienced more modest price declines during their respective negative demand shocks.   
 
Figure 4: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using Appraisal-
based data) 
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The R2 of this regression is 50% and the slope coefficient is strongly significant.  The 
correlation is computed between the total property return, including dividends, and the 
change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using all available data.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the 
property market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for 
each country.  According to our theory, negative correlation is a symptom of underpricing, 
and is associated with larger losses during a market downturn.  Countries that do not 
exhibit the symptom of underpricing have zero or positive correlation.   
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3.3 Transaction-based indices 
The most appropriate data for verification of our hypothesis is real estate price 
indices based on transaction data.  Unfortunately, the availability of such data across 
countries is extremely limited.  Therefore, in what follows, we focus on one particular 
market for which we have rare and very high quality transaction data.  In particular, we use 
transaction data for apartment buildings in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area from CoStar 
COMPS.  The firm produces high quality transactions data for a wide range of income 
producing properties.  The firm has provided data for all transactions in Los Angeles 
County apartment buildings that occurred between January 1989 and July 2001 for a total 
of 18,168 observations.6   Table 1 provides summary statistics describing the transactions 
that occurred during the period.  The mean and median per unit price during this period 
were a little more than $50,000 per unit.  As can be seen from the table the typical LA 
County apartment complex is relatively small and the distribution of complex size is 
positively skewed, with a median of 10 and a mean of 17 units.  
 
                                                 
6 The transaction data were screened for outliers and influential observations. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for transactions 1/1988-9/2000. 
 Price per 
unit 
Cap Rate Age Parking 
Spaces 
Number of 
Units 
Mean $56,896 .09 29 21 17 
Median $52,500 .09 32 12 10 
Standard 
Deviation 
$28,076 .03 20 31 20 
 
To calculate the value of an apartment building we estimate the time series of rates 
of appreciation of the per unit price of LA County apartments.  We use the following semi-
log hedonic value model to estimate this series: 
 ln(Valueit ) = Constant + b∑
=
T
t 2
t  St  +  a’Ci, + e (6)  
                                                
where Valueit is the price paid for property i sold at time t, Ci is a vector of physical 
characteristics that describe the building, St is a matrix of indicator variables for the time of 
sale, and bt is the marginal time effect ( i.e., monthly).  T is the total number of months in 
the sample and e is an error term with zero expectation.7  Thus bt is an estimate of the rate 
of appreciation for time period t.  The mean of the vector b provides an estimate of the 
expected monthly rate of apartment appreciation.  
Tables 2 and 3 report the parameter estimates and implied appreciation rates 
obtained by estimating Equation (6).  The parameter estimates presented in Table 2 have 
 
7 The  bt  are estimated as follows.  If a transaction occurred during January 1989 (i.e., t=1), all time indicator 
variables are assigned a value of zero.  If a transaction occurred during the second month, the first time 
indicator variable is assigned a value of one and all other time indicator variables are set to zero.  If a 
transaction occurred during the third month, the first two indicators are set to one and all others are set to 
zero. 
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the expected signs and are consistent with those obtained from previous research.  From 
Table 3 we can see that our model estimated an average monthly appreciation rate of nearly 
zero with a standard deviation of more than six percent.  
Table 2: Parameter Estimates 
N=18830 
R2 = .44 
Age Age 
Squared 
# of 
parking 
spots per 
unit 
# of 
parking 
spots per 
unit 
squared 
# of units # of units 
squared 
Estimate -.006 4x10E-5 .22 -.005 -.011 6x10E-4 
St. Error .0004 6x10E-6 .006 .0003 .0003 1x10E-6 
 
 
Table 3: Implied monthly rates of price appreciation 
Average 
Appreciation Rate 
Standard Deviation 
of the 
Appreciation Rate 
Median 
Appreciation Rate 
Skewness of the 
Appreciation Rate 
0≈  .0616 -.001 -.06 
 
 
 Figure 5 depicts the time series of estimates of the value (September, 1988=100) of 
a typical apartment building implied by the parameter estimates of Equation (6).  As can be 
seen from this figure, the late 1980s and 1990s were a boom/bust period for Southern 
California property values.  Between 1988 and the end of 1989 the per unit price of Los 
Angeles County apartment building increased by approximately 16 percent.  Between the 
1989 peak and November 1995 trough per unit prices fell by more than 48 percent.  By the 
beginning of 2000 per unit prices are more than 40 percent above their low.   
 
 
 
 21
Figure 5: Apartment Building Price per Unit Index 
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We use the above time series for the value of the asset to test the empirical 
implications of out model described in Section 2.  The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
provides U.S. interest rate data.  The first prediction of our theory is that the spread 
between lending and borrowing rates is negatively correlated with asset prices.  We 
compute the spread as the difference between prime lending rates and 1-month certificate 
of deposit rates.  The correlation between this spread and the asset price described above is 
– 67%.  This high negative correlation provides very strong support for the hypothesis that 
underpricing was prevalent in Los Angeles during the run-up of property prices.   
While this is only a single observation and does not provide a test of whether 
underpricing magnifies asset price declines during potential market crashes, it allows us to 
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expand the model by including additional explanatory variables.  In particular, we include 
macroeconomic variables that have the potential to impact real estate values, such as labor 
force growth, unemployment rate, personal income, and mortgage rates.  Table 5 reports 
the results of these regressions. 
 
Table 5: Asset Prices and Interest Rates (II) 
Dep. Var. is percent 
change in asset 
price 
Spread of 
lending 
over 
deposit 
rates 
Labor 
Force 
Unempl. Personal 
income 
Mortgage 
rates 
Base Case  .38 
(.65) 
-.14 
(-1.9) 
.30 
(1.55) 
-.09 
(-.49) 
Spread 1 -.12 
(-1.82) 
.26 
(.44) 
-.06 
(-.75) 
.28 
(1.49) 
-.02 
(-.09) 
Spread 2 -.12 
(-1.87) 
.30 
(.50) 
-.07 
(-.75) 
.03 
(.21) 
 
Spread 3 -.12 
(1.87) 
.31 
(.54) 
-.07 
(-.89) 
  
Spread 4 -.15 
(-2.58) 
    
Notes to Table 5:  All variables, dependent and independent, are in one month percent 
change form.  t-statistic is in prentices.  The adjusted R2 of all regressions varies between 2 
and 7%.   
 
 
The one common feature of all models is that the spread of lending over deposit 
rates remains negatively correlated with asset returns, even in the presence of various 
controls.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that asset prices in Los Angeles were 
driven by underpricing of the default put options imbedded in non-recourse lending in 
addition to all other macroeconomic factors affecting real estate markets. 
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4.  Detailed Analysis of Some of the Markets 
In what follows, we provide an in-depth analysis of most of the markets included in 
our empirical tests above.  In particular, we provide the specific market and institutional 
events and characteristics that contributed to the correctly priced or underpriced lending.  
While this does not offer a rigorous test of our theory, it does provide some robustness 
checks to supplement the statistical analysis.  More importantly, it summarizes the 
institutional and market circumstances that have contributed in the past to possible 
underpricing. 
In the case of Singapore, tight control was exercised by the government over land 
sales and such sales were accelerated in the 1990s to dampen the property market as real 
estate prices rose.  Hence, property prices were not allowed to spiral out of control.  
Moreover, real estate loans were tightened in 1996 to curb speculation in property.  Among 
the measures introduced was to treat capital gains of real estate transactions as taxable 
income if the sale of the property took place within three years of purchase.  The maximum 
loan quantum was also fixed at 80% of the appraised real estate value.  All these measures 
combined to reduce the degree of underpricing in the Singapore property market.  Our 
finding that Singapore did not exhibit the symptom of underpricing and that its total market 
decline following the Asian financial crisis was relatively less severe is not surprising. 
In the case of Hong Kong, the currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar at HK$7.8 to 
one U.S. dollar.  As a result, Hong Kong interest rates moved in line with the U.S. interest 
rates.  This in turn acted as a mechanism to prevent Hong-Kong-based banks from 
underpricing in the property market.  Not surprisingly, then, the Hong Kong lending market 
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did not exhibit the symptom of underpricing (as indicated in Figure 1), and also 
experienced a relatively modest price decline during the Asian crisis.   
Indonesia, on the other hand, enjoyed very strong inflows of foreign capital in the 
early 1990s up to the eve of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, and domestic deposit rates 
fell in the wake of the inflow.  As foreign capital surged into Indonesia, speculation in the 
real estate market, driven by cheap financing, was rampant.  Loan quantum and credit 
facilities of up to 90% of the collateral value were common for investments in real estate 
properties (Mera and Renaud, 2000).  This flood of liquidity led to a sharp price 
appreciation in the asset markets, inflated collateral value and prompted further credit 
expansion as asset prices climbed.  Indonesia experienced the symptom of underpricing 
(Indonesia is part of Figure 4), and a subsequent price decline of 80% or more.    
In Thailand, foreign inflows similarly fuelled the rise in the property market, and 
underpricing was rampant as banks competed by increasing loan amounts, reducing interest 
rates for certain customers, and even extending renovation loans.  With a pegged exchange 
rate (up to 1 July 1997), it was attractive to borrow in offshore market and then invest in 
real estate projects.   By 1996, the loan exposure of the real estate sector in Thailand was 
estimated at 30-40% of total loans with a value of US$160 billion.  Consistent with our 
findings (Figure 4), Thailand experienced a very sever case of underpricing and the largest 
price decline in our dataset.   
Malaysia also saw a significant buildup in the exposure to the property market.  
From 1992-96 more than 70% of bank lending in Malaysia was channeled into real estate 
and stock-market investments.  Barth et al. (1998) estimate that expansion in bank credit to 
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the private sector, relative to GDP growth during the 1990–1996 period was 40% in 
Malaysia, 62% in Indonesia, 115% in the Philippines, and 70% in Thailand.  By 
comparison, the growth was 19% in Germany, 3% in Japan, 16% in the United Kingdom, 
and 21.5% in the United States.  Again, consistent with our empirical analysis (Figure 1 
and 4), Malaysia exhibited the symptom of underpricing, although to a lesser extent than 
Thailand and Indonesia, and also experienced a severe price decline during the Asian 
financial crisis.   
At a first glance Japan appears to be an outlier in our analysis.  There is no evidence 
of underpricing as the correlation between asset returns and changes in lending spreads is 
positive.  Japan’s steep price decline is, therefore, inconsistent with our theory.  The reality 
is that the explanation for Japan’s real estate bubble and subsequent decline lies elsewhere.   
Monetary and exchange rate policies in the 1980s resulted in excessive money supply and 
extremely low interest rates.  The land boom began in the mid 1980s after the 1985 Plaza 
Accord amongst the finance ministers and chairmen of central banks from the G5 countries 
agreed to push down the value of the dollar and strengthen the yen.  The yen dramatically 
appreciated from 244 yen/dollar in September 1985 to 152 in August 1986 (Saito, 2003).  
The dramatic appreciation over a short period resulted in fears of a recession driven by loss 
of competitiveness of Japanese exports. This led the Bank of Japan to slash its discount 
rates from 5 to 2.5 percent over 15 months, and to keep the money supply abundant.  
Banks, insurance companies and non-banks also invested heavily in real estate.  The bubble 
ended when tight monetary policies, credit controls on bank lending to real estate, and a 
new real estate tax on land were introduced by Japan’s finance ministry between 1988 and 
1992.  Thus, even though Japan experienced a substantial price decline, this decline was 
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likely caused by other macroeconomic factors not by underpricing the default spread of 
mortgage loans. 
5. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
By any measure, real-estate markets in many countries around the globe, including 
in the US and Canada, prices are at, or above, their historic highs. Such an environment 
naturally fuels fears that we are in a midst of a real-estate price bubble that will inevitably 
burst. Even the strongest proponents of the bubble theories, however, will admit that it is 
nearly impossible to accurately detect a real-estate bubble. At this stage, we still cannot tell 
whether there is a bubble or if our economic fundamentals will prove strong enough to 
support the new higher prices.  
While we offer no remedy to this predicament, there are historical precedents 
around the globe that do provide some insights for the future of the real estate markets 
around the world.  If there is one thing that the most severe real-estate bubbles have had in 
common, it is easy access to low-cost credit. When this happens, real-estate investors and 
homeowners take advantage of it and bid up land prices above their fundamental levels. 
While this may or may not start a market price bubble, it can certainly make it worse. Easy 
access to low-cost financing stimulates demand and drives up prices. If the lending 
standards in this type of environment are lax, or weakened further, in order to increase 
profits for lenders, the risk of a bubble is heightened. The bubble then bursts when market 
prices exceed the fundamental values of the underlying properties by so much that even 
virtually costless financing cannot generate more demand. 
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We all know what follows. The more reckless the lending industry is, the longer the 
bubble can survive, and the harder it bursts. For instance, we found in this paper that the 
lending sector was a major contributor to the real-estate price bubble in the mid-1990s in 
countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Conversely, Singapore and Hong 
Kong maintained far more restrictive lending practices, and the lending sector did not 
contribute to the price inflation there. 
While all of the countries in our study experienced deep price declines during their 
respective crisis, these declines were two to three times more severe in the countries where 
access to funds for real-estate development or ownership was unrestricted and very cheap. 
Empirical evidence from earlier real-estate market bubbles across the globe also seems to 
strongly support this idea. 
In a more recent case, John Laker, Chairman of the Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority, suggested that lax lending standards in Australia are potentially 
contributing to Australia's real-estate boom where home prices have increased much more 
dramatically than in North America.  In response, the Regulatory Authority has taken steps 
to strengthen bank lending standards to prevent further price inflation due to excessive 
availability of funds. 
Similarly, there is real concern, recently expressed by former Chairman of the US 
Fed, Alan Greenspan, that price rises in the US are being artificially fuelled by new and 
exotic mortgage instruments that embody overly liberal lending standards.  While we 
cannot say to what degree these instruments are contributing to asset price inflation, we do 
know the direction of their impact.  We also know that in the aftermath of a negative 
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demand shock, prices will fall both to adjust to new supply and demand fundamentals and 
to compensate for past lending mistakes.   
The bottom line is that we are still unable to detect market bubbles before they 
burst, but at least we can estimate their severity by examining the impact of lending 
practices prevalent in the market.  Furthermore, the model shows the extent to which 
lending-industry regulators can mitigate the economic impact of a potential bubble by 
enforcing prudent lending standards.
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